a . a ; "Allow the interaction; record a DeonticVerdict for later review/prosecution (the verdict path).". a ; "System determines and BLOCKS preemptively, per instruction, before harm (DenyRollback).". a ; "Halt and ask the human (q42:AmbiguousMapping / human-in-loop).". a ; "Allow AND give priority (QoS) — the POSITIVE axis: for humanitarian-ICT (humanitarian-ict.n3) in adverse conditions. The promote half of distinguish-useful-from-abuse.". a . a ; ; . a ; ; . a ; ; . a ; "The person/dependent this policy protects or serves.". a ; . a . a ; "Non-derogable protective rule (child safety, illegal conduct). MUST be law-grounded + contestable (policy:MandatoryLegitimacyShape) — not platform fiat.". a ; "Set by a guardian for a dependent (ties values:guardian; must respect the child's evolving capacity — CRC).". a ; "Set by the natural person for their OWN engagement (their agency; ties the §4.4 stipulation route).". a ; "MandatoryBaseline > GuardianPolicy > UserPreference; ties break toward the stricter (more protective).". a . a ; ; "Category whose definition varies by jurisdiction/era/age — resolved via sense.n3, not silently fixed.". a . a . a . a . a ; "Tracking cookies / cross-site tracking.". a ; true; "Sub-categories extend here; what counts varies by jurisdiction/age (sense.n3).". a ; "Deception for gain (fraud); MandatoryBaseline-eligible (fraud law).". a ; "Credential/identity theft via deception — an IDENTITY-deception; the signal is policy:claimedIdentityUnverifiable, resolved against the signed-identity/provenance fabric.". a ; "Spoofing a person/institution; identity-deception — ties values:actsFor/principal + selfhood/identity (an agent claiming an identity/principal it cannot substantiate).". a ; "Unsolicited bulk contact; ties policy:unsolicited + UserPreference/consent (+ anti-spam law where applicable).". a ; "Malicious code/payload; MandatoryBaseline-eligible.". a ; "Manipulation to extract info/action; overlaps the coercion/duress surface (agency.n3 CoercedConsentFlag).". a ; ; "Marks consent-violating contact (spam).". a ; ; "An agent asserts an identity/principal it cannot substantiate — the core phishing/impersonation signal; checked against the signed-identity / provenance fabric.". a ; "The law/instrument a mandatory policy is grounded in (e.g. CRC for child safety).". a ; "How a person contests a block (court-supporting; agency.n3 §10.5).". a . a ; ; "A mandatory preventive-block policy MUST carry policy:groundedIn (law) AND policy:appealPath (contestable); otherwise it is policy:OverreachFlag. (Conditional enforced at wiring: source=MandatoryBaseline ∧ mode=PreventiveBlock ⇒ groundedIn≥1 ∧ appealPath≥1.)".