This instrument defines specific modalities of human agency and fundamental freedoms. The RDF properties and SHACL shapes parsed below codify these rights as affirmable undertakings binding upon actors.
Note: We strictly map these rights to the natural person, prioritizing self-determination and autonomy. Institutional constructs (such as corporate personhood) are explicitly disjoint from these human-centric dignity classifications within the SHACL constraints.
Contextual Data Structures (CML & nquins)
The underlying structure of this schema utilizes nquins and Context Markup Language (CML) to provide deep, context-aware semantic mapping.
This architecture ensures that whenever multiple cryptography-supported identifiers are utilized to manage state or attribute assertions, they remain entirely enumerated and compartmentalized. This prevents the blending of distinct agent presence modalities and secures the structural integrity of the Human-Centric system against opaque institutional tracking.
Triples / Shapes Viewer
@prefix rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> .
@prefix rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#> .
@prefix sh: <http://www.w3.org/ns/shacl#> .
@prefix xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> .
@prefix values: <https://ns.webcivics.net/values/> .
@prefix sense: <https://ns.webcivics.net/sense/> .
@prefix policy: <https://ns.webcivics.net/policy/> .
# ===========================================================================
# policy.n3 — enforcement-mode / interaction-governance layer (PLAN.md §14).
# The ENFORCEMENT half of the evaluation/enforcement split: it decides, per
# interaction/category, whether to ALLOW + record a verdict (permissive) or to
# BLOCK preemptively (preventive). This is "Core 2 downstream routing"; the
# DeonticVerdict path (deontic.rs) feeds it. Primary use: grappling with bad
# bots + protecting the vulnerable. The protective mode is double-edged and is
# itself held to rule-of-law — "system determinations" must NOT become
# unaccountable censorship/control.
# ===========================================================================
# --- The setting: what happens to an evaluated interaction ---
policy:EnforcementMode a rdfs:Class .
policy:PermissiveAudit a policy:EnforcementMode ;
rdfs:comment "Allow the interaction; record a DeonticVerdict for later review/prosecution (the verdict path)." .
policy:PreventiveBlock a policy:EnforcementMode ;
rdfs:comment "System determines and BLOCKS preemptively, per instruction, before harm (DenyRollback)." .
policy:Interactive a policy:EnforcementMode ;
rdfs:comment "Halt and ask the human (q42:AmbiguousMapping / human-in-loop)." .
policy:Prioritize a policy:EnforcementMode ;
rdfs:comment "Allow AND give priority (QoS) — the POSITIVE axis: for humanitarian-ICT (humanitarian-ict.n3) in adverse conditions. The promote half of distinguish-useful-from-abuse." .
# --- A policy: a rule governing a category, with a mode + a source ---
policy:Policy a rdfs:Class .
policy:governsCategory a rdf:Property ; rdfs:domain policy:Policy ; rdfs:range policy:Category .
policy:enforcementMode a rdf:Property ; rdfs:domain policy:Policy ; rdfs:range policy:EnforcementMode .
policy:policySource a rdf:Property ; rdfs:domain policy:Policy ; rdfs:range policy:PolicySource .
policy:appliesToAgent a rdf:Property ; rdfs:comment "The person/dependent this policy protects or serves." .
policy:derogable a rdf:Property ; rdfs:range xsd:boolean .
# --- Who sets it (the spectrum) ---
policy:PolicySource a rdfs:Class .
policy:MandatoryBaseline a policy:PolicySource ;
rdfs:comment "Non-derogable protective rule (child safety, illegal conduct). MUST be law-grounded + contestable (policy:MandatoryLegitimacyShape) — not platform fiat." .
policy:GuardianPolicy a policy:PolicySource ;
rdfs:comment "Set by a guardian for a dependent (ties values:guardian; must respect the child's evolving capacity — CRC)." .
policy:UserPreference a policy:PolicySource ;
rdfs:comment "Set by the natural person for their OWN engagement (their agency; ties the §4.4 stipulation route)." .
# Precedence (enforced at wiring): a non-derogable MandatoryBaseline cannot be
# relaxed by a Guardian/User policy; Guardian/User may only be STRICTER (more
# protective). Within what the baseline permits, Guardian (for dependents) then
# User set the terms. A user/guardian policy that tries to UNBLOCK a non-derogable
# mandatory rule is void.
policy:precedenceRank a rdf:Property ; rdfs:comment "MandatoryBaseline > GuardianPolicy > UserPreference; ties break toward the stricter (more protective)." .
# --- Categories (STARTER taxonomy; extensible; definitions are sense-qualified) ---
policy:Category a rdfs:Class .
policy:senseQualified a rdf:Property ; rdfs:range xsd:boolean ;
rdfs:comment "Category whose definition varies by jurisdiction/era/age — resolved via sense.n3, not silently fixed." .
policy:ChildSafety a policy:Category .
policy:MisleadingDeceptiveConduct a policy:Category .
policy:OrganizedCrime a policy:Category .
policy:Extortion a policy:Category .
policy:Tracking a policy:Category ; rdfs:comment "Tracking cookies / cross-site tracking." .
policy:AdultContent a policy:Category ; policy:senseQualified true ;
rdfs:comment "Sub-categories extend here; what counts varies by jurisdiction/age (sense.n3)." .
# Deception & fraud family — the mass-scale "bad bots" in practice; PreventiveBlock-eligible.
policy:Scam a policy:Category ; rdfs:comment "Deception for gain (fraud); MandatoryBaseline-eligible (fraud law)." .
policy:Phishing a policy:Category ;
rdfs:comment "Credential/identity theft via deception — an IDENTITY-deception; the signal is policy:claimedIdentityUnverifiable, resolved against the signed-identity/provenance fabric." .
policy:Impersonation a policy:Category ;
rdfs:comment "Spoofing a person/institution; identity-deception — ties values:actsFor/principal + selfhood/identity (an agent claiming an identity/principal it cannot substantiate)." .
policy:Spam a policy:Category ; rdfs:comment "Unsolicited bulk contact; ties policy:unsolicited + UserPreference/consent (+ anti-spam law where applicable)." .
policy:Malware a policy:Category ; rdfs:comment "Malicious code/payload; MandatoryBaseline-eligible." .
policy:SocialEngineering a policy:Category ;
rdfs:comment "Manipulation to extract info/action; overlaps the coercion/duress surface (agency.n3 CoercedConsentFlag)." .
policy:unsolicited a rdf:Property ; rdfs:range xsd:boolean ;
rdfs:comment "Marks consent-violating contact (spam)." .
policy:claimedIdentityUnverifiable a rdf:Property ; rdfs:range xsd:boolean ;
rdfs:comment "An agent asserts an identity/principal it cannot substantiate — the core phishing/impersonation signal; checked against the signed-identity / provenance fabric." .
# ===========================================================================
# Rule-of-law guard ON the protective mode itself. A MandatoryBaseline that
# BLOCKS without law-grounding + an appeal/contest path is OVERREACH — the
# enforcement layer must not become unaccountable censorship. Mirror of
# values:RuleOfLawAsymmetryFlag (agency.n3): rule of law protects the citizen
# FROM the enforcer too.
# ===========================================================================
policy:groundedIn a rdf:Property ; rdfs:comment "The law/instrument a mandatory policy is grounded in (e.g. CRC for child safety)." .
policy:appealPath a rdf:Property ; rdfs:comment "How a person contests a block (court-supporting; agency.n3 §10.5)." .
policy:OverreachFlag a rdfs:Class .
policy:MandatoryLegitimacyShape a sh:NodeShape ;
sh:targetClass policy:Policy ;
sh:message "A mandatory preventive-block policy MUST carry policy:groundedIn (law) AND policy:appealPath (contestable); otherwise it is policy:OverreachFlag. (Conditional enforced at wiring: source=MandatoryBaseline ∧ mode=PreventiveBlock ⇒ groundedIn≥1 ∧ appealPath≥1.)" .